Game Theory 101: The Complete Textbook

✍ Scribed by William Spaniel

• Publisher: Create Space Independant Publishing
• Year: 2011
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 377
• Edition: First
• Category: Library

✦ Synopsis

Game Theory 101: The Complete Textbook is a no-nonsense, games-centered introduction to strategic form (matrix) and extensive form (game tree) games. From the first lesson to the last, this textbook introduces games of increasing complexity and then teaches the game theoretical tools necessary to solve them. Inside, you will find:

1) All the basics fully explained, including pure strategy Nash equilibrium, mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, the mixed strategy algorithm, how to calculate payoffs, strict dominance, weak dominance, iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies, subgame perfect equilibrium, backward induction, forward induction, and more.

2) Dozens of games solved, including the prisoner’s dilemma, stag hunt, matching pennies, zero sum games, battle of the sexes/Bach or Stravinsky, chicken/snowdrift, pure coordination, deadlock, safety in numbers, Selten's game, the escalation game, the ultimatum game, the pirate game, nim, the centipede game, the hawk-dove game, the volunteer's dilemma, and rock-paper-scissors.

3) Rich descriptions of important economic concepts such as commitment problems, burning bridges, perverse incentives, and the chain store paradox.

4) Advanced topics such as generalized games, comparative statics, and knife-edge conditions.

5) Real world applications including wars, firm entry/exit, tournament strategy, arms races, advertising, game shows, soccer, baseball, video games, and more.

6) Crystal clear, line-by-line calculations of every step, with more than 400 images so you don’t miss a thing.

Quick, efficient, and to the point, Game Theory 101: The Complete Textbook is perfect for introductory game theory, intermediate microeconomics, and political science.

✦ Table of Contents

Lesson 1.1: The Prisoner’s Dilemma and Strict Dominance
Lesson 1.2: Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies
Lesson 1.3: The Stag Hunt, Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium, and Best Responses
Lesson 1.4: Dominance and Nash Equilibrium
Lesson 1.5: Matching Pennies and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
Lesson 1.6: Calculating Payoffs
Lesson 1.7: Strict Dominance in Mixed Strategies
Lesson 1.8: The Odd Rule and Infinitely Many Equilibria
Lesson 2.1: Game Trees and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Lesson 2.2: Backward Induction
Lesson 2.3: Multiple Subgame Perfect Equilibria
Lesson 2.4: Making Threats Credible
Lesson 2.5: Commitment Problems
Lesson 2.6: Backward Induction without a Game Tree
Lesson 2.7: Problems with Backward Induction
Lesson 2.8: Forward Induction
Lesson 3.1: Probability Distributions
Lesson 3.2: Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Generalized Games
Lesson 3.3: Knife-Edge Equilibria
Lesson 3.4: Comparative Statics
Lesson 3.5: Generalizing Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
Lesson 3.6: Rock-Paper-Scissors
Lesson 4.1: Infinite Strategy Spaces, Second Price Auctions, duels, and the Median Voter Theorem
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