The theory of competition has held a central place in economic analysis since the time of Adam Smith. This book, written by one of the most distinguished of contemporary economic theorists, reports on a major research program to provide strategic foundations for the theory of competition. Making use
Game Equilibrium Models III: Strategic Bargaining
β Scribed by Reinhard Selten (auth.), Professor Dr. Reinhard Selten (eds.)
- Publisher
- Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
- Year
- 1991
- Tongue
- English
- Leaves
- 291
- Edition
- 1
- Category
- Library
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
β¦ Synopsis
The four volumes of Game Equilibrium Models present applications of non-cooperative game theory. Problems of strategic interaction arising in biology, economics, political science and the social sciences in general are treated in 42 papers on a wide variety of subjects. Internationally known authors with backgrounds in various disciplines have contributed original research. The reader finds innovative modelling combined with advanced methods of analysis. The four volumes are the outcome of a research year at the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the University of Bielefeld. The close interaction of an international interdisciplinary group of researchers has produced an unusual collection of remarkable results of great interest for everybody who wants to be informed on the scope, potential, and future direction of work in applied game theory. Volume III Strategic Bargaining contains ten papers on game equilibrium models of bargaining. All these contributions look at bargaining situations as non-cooperative games. General models of two-person and n-person bargaining are explored.
β¦ Table of Contents
Front Matter....Pages I-IX
Introduction to the Series βGame Equilibrium Modelsβ....Pages 1-2
Introduction to Volume III: βStrategic Bargainingβ....Pages 3-6
A Noncooperative Approach to the Nash Bargaining Problem....Pages 7-33
A Two-Person Repeated Bargaining Game with Long-Term Contracts....Pages 34-47
Three Approaches to Bargaining in NTU Games....Pages 48-69
Folk Theorems for the Proposal-Making Model....Pages 70-79
A Noncooperative Model of Bargaining in Simple Spatial Games....Pages 80-117
Demand Commitment Bargaining: - The Case Of Apex Games -....Pages 118-140
Prominence, Competition, Learning, and the Generation of Offers in Computer-Aided Experimental Spatial Games....Pages 141-185
Original or Fake β A Bargaining Game with Incomplete Information....Pages 186-229
Wage Bargaining as a Strategic Game....Pages 230-241
A Game Equilibrium Model of Thin Markets....Pages 242-282
Back Matter....Pages 283-284
β¦ Subjects
Economic Theory; Operation Research/Decision Theory; Mathematical and Computational Biology; Statistics for Life Sciences, Medicine, Health Sciences
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The theory of competition has held a central place in economic analysis since the time of Adam Smith. This book, written by one of the most distinguished of contemporary economic theorists, reports on a major research program to provide strategic foundations for the theory of competition. Making use
Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory. It especially shows the way the use of axiomatic models has been complemented by the new results derived from strategic models. The papers in this volume are edited versions of those gi