Future's Back: Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory, and Crisis Stability after the Cold War

✍ Scribed by Frank P. Harvey

Publisher: McGill-Queen's University Press
Year: 1994
Tongue: English
Leaves: 209
Category: Library

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

✦ Synopsis

Given the likely proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the future, and the failure of "non-proliferation" regimes to provide effective barriers to the spread of nuclear technology in the past, efforts towards greater understanding of nuclear rivalry are crucial. The Future's Back provides a valuable framework for organizing and evaluating research on superpower rivalry and nuclear deterrence.

✦ Table of Contents

Contents
Tables and Figures
Acknowledgments
Introduction
1 Cumulation in International Relations: Methodological Constraints and Solutions
2 Nuclear Deterrence: The Record of Aggregate Testing
3 New Directions for Aggregate Testing
4 Game Theory and Superpower Rivalry, 1948–88
5 U.S.-Soviet Rivalry and Nuclear Deterrence
6 Nuclear Stability after the Cold War
7 Conventional Deterrence and Compellence Theory: Perspectives on Testing after the Cold War
Notes
Bibliography
Index
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
R
S
T
V
W
Y
Z

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