Though B.F. Skinner's work has attracted a rather substantial philosophical audience, its attention has not for the most part been directed toward an examination of his provocative, and in the view of some, outrageous claim that the science of operant behavior is the science of values. This is, I believe, an unfortunate omission and needs redressing. Though I shall not attempt any kind of comprehensive analysis of Skinner's views on ethics and values, the recent appearance of Gilbert Fulmer's paper, "Skinner's Values," does provide the opportunity for an initial attempt to clarify Skinner's position, even if a critical examination will have to be put off to another day. 1 Thus in this paper I will discuss Fulmer's account of Skinner's position on values, and, in the process of pointing out what I consider to be some of his fundamental misunderstandings of Skinner's position, sketch some of the basic lines of Skinner's views on ethics and values. I shall as Fulmer confine my analysis for the most part to Skinner's Beyond Freedom and Dignity. 2
Fulmer's Skinner
Fulmer's contention is that Skinner's proposal that the science of operant behavior is a science of values fails on logical grounds. That is to say, Skinner can offer no reasons in support of his position both in the sense that the reasons he does offer are inadequate or inconsistent and that his program does not allow him to appeal to reasons.
According to Fulmer the reasons that Skinner might offer to support his social and political reforms are that such reforms are positively reinforcing and that they will promote cultural survival. But neither of these reasons are, in Fulmer's view, adequate since they either fail to specify for whom the reforms will be positively reinforcing or cannot specify why cultural survival will reinforce anyone.
If Skinner would specify for whom the reforms are positively reinforcing, then some of the Caligulas of this world and a large number of others, the ordinary selfish Joes and Janes of this world, who will not find the positive reinforcement of others personally reinforcing, will not be persuaded by Skinner. Furthermore, even if Skinner could persuade them, he cannot