From Reproduction to Evolutionary Governance: Toward an Evolutionary Political Economy (Evolutionary Economics and Social Complexity Science, 20)

✍ Scribed by Kiichiro Yagi (editor)

• Publisher: Springer
• Year: 2020
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 198
• Category: Library

✦ Synopsis

This book combines modern evolutionary economics and classical political economy. Modern evolutionary economics with its pluralistic and contingent view of reproduction does not presuppose equilibrium or harmonious reproduction. A society that consists of multiple agents needs to establish an order from the interactions of those agents. The book introduces a normative and a practical dimension where mutual justification occurs through the act of exchange. Mutual justification ultimately leads to the emergence of social and economic order, an approach that the author dubs “approval theory.” The division of labor proceeds alongside the emergence of money and capital, and the book discusses the dual structure of the real and financial economy that is the consequence. It then interprets collective action using the twin concept of voice and exit and proposes the concept of evolutionary governance to explain the politico-economic aspects of the social economy.
As such, this book shows the promising direction in which the modern political economy is now proceeding, in accordance with the contingent process of evolutionary reproduction. Further, two collaborating authors supply a game-theoretical interpretation of approval theory and an exploration of the evolution of dynamical systems, respectively.

✦ Table of Contents

Preface
Contents
Editor and Contributors
About the Editor
About the Contributors
List of Figures
List of Tables
Part I: Political Economy
Chapter 1: From Reproduction to Evolutionary Governance
1.1 Individuals in a Society
1.2 Reproduction View in Economics
1.2.1 Main Features of Reproduction
1.2.1.1 Trend Embedded in the Present and the Possibility of Change Based on It
1.2.1.2 Depersonalization of Interdependent Relations, Their Emergence as Macroeconomic Factors
1.2.1.3 Reproduction of Actors and Their Social Relations
1.2.1.4 Rationality That Corresponds to the Reproduction
1.2.1.5 Historical Path Dependence and Evolutionary Development
1.3 Evolutionary View of Social Change
1.4 Formation and Evolution of Governance
References
Chapter 2: Approval Theory and Social Contract
2.1 The Debate on Property and Civil Society
2.2 Approval Theory of Social Order
2.2.1 The Stable State of Civil Order
2.2.2 Autonomous Approval and Synchronous Approval on the Normative Domain
2.2.3 Solidarity and Generality of the Interest in the Substantial Domain
2.3 Range and Depth of Social Contract Reconsidered
2.3.1 Modern Questions for the Revival of Social Contract Theory
2.3.2 Introduction of the Dialectic of Master and Servant
2.3.3 Hidden Domain of the Sentiment
2.4 Discourse Ethics and Naturalized Social Contract
2.4.1 Discourse Ethics and the Kantian Imperative
2.4.2 Naturalized Social Contracts
2.4.3 Preliminary Conclusion
References
Chapter 3: Economic Exchange and Social Exchange
3.1 Social Exchange Reconsidered
3.2 Approval as the Precondition of Exchange
3.3 Micro and Macro in the Social Exchange
3.4 Market and Organization as the Complex of the Micro–Macro Linkage
3.5 Complex System of Exchange and Its Governance
References
Chapter 4: Institutional Dynamics of the Capitalist Market Economy
4.1 Division of Labor Generates Money and Capital
4.1.1 Division of Labor as the Source of Evolution
4.1.2 Emergence of Money as an Unintended Consequence
4.2 Transactions Under Capitalism
4.3 Voice, Exit, and Loyalty in the Industrial Relations
References
Chapter 5: Evolution of Commercial and Financial Structures of Capitalism
5.1 Merchants and Commercial Society
5.2 Money and Time in Commerce and Finance
5.2.1 Money Is Time?
5.2.2 Financial Market
5.3 Evolution and Governance of the Financial Structure: Japanese Experience
5.3.1 Japanese Financial System Under the Structural Change
5.3.2 Institutional Reforms
5.3.3 Structural Changes
5.3.4 The Governance of National Economy
5.3.5 The Shift in FSA’s Governance
References
Chapter 6: System Transition and the Institutional Political Economy
6.1 “Transition” Theory of Socialists Before the Fall of the Berlin Wall
6.2 From Institutional Economics to the Institutional Political Economy
6.3 Endogeneity and Exogeneity in the Transition
References
Part I: Appendices
Road to Evolutionary and Institutional Economics in Japan: A Personal Memoire of the Decade of Founding the Japan Association for Evolutionary Economics
Appendix 1: Foundation of the Japan Association for Evolutionary Economics
Appendix 2: Personal Recollections
Appendix 3: General Judgment in the Early Twenty-First Century
Part II: Further Explorations
Chapter 7: Interpretation of Approval Theory Related to Norms and Interests: Interpretation by Image Score Model and Reputation Dynamics
7.1 Introduction
7.1.1 Approval Theory on Norms and Interests
7.1.2 Normative Domain
7.1.3 Practical Domain
7.1.4 Social State
7.2 Image Score as a Norm: “Individual Norm = General Norm” Model
7.2.1 Image Score Model
7.2.2 The Region of General Norm in the Image Score Model
7.3 Individual Norm Dynamics
7.3.1 Reputation and Norm
7.3.2 Gap Between General Norms and Individual Norms
7.3.3 “Leading Eight” as a General Norm and Its Region
7.3.3.1 Maintain a Cooperative Relationship
7.3.3.2 Identification of Deviant
7.3.3.3 Punishment and Justification for Punishment
7.3.3.4 Apologies and Acceptance
7.4 Conclusion
References
Chapter 8: On the Relatedness Between R. A. Fisher’s FTNS and J. S. Metcalfe’s Construction
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Rediscovery of FTNS by Fisher-Price-Frank
8.2.1 Examination of FTNS by G. Price
8.2.2 Construction by Frank
8.2.3 Natural Selection as an Agent Applying Statistical Inference
8.2.4 Into the Market
8.2.5 Comparison Between Biological System and Market
8.3 Metcalfe’s Theory
8.3.1 Metcalfe’s Key Concepts and Construction
8.3.2 ‘Fisher’s Principle’ as Reinterpretation of FTNS by Metcalfe
8.3.3 The Case of Interference
8.3.4 Postscript to Metcalfe’s Construction
8.4 Discussion: Search for Dynamic Efficiency and for Evolutionary Market Analysis
8.4.1 Implication of ‘Fisher’s Principle’
8.4.2 FTNS and Two Frames of Reference for the Dynamical System
8.4.3 On the Several Norms of Efficiency
8.5 Conclusion
References