Frequency of paradox in a common n-winner voting scheme
✍ Scribed by Douglas W. Mitchell; William N. Trumbull
- Publisher
- Springer US
- Year
- 1992
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 717 KB
- Volume
- 73
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0048-5829
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
✦ Synopsis
This paper investigates the extent to which a commonly used electoral scheme -voting for n candidates when there are n vacancies to fill -is likely to lead, in practice, to paradoxical results. Two types of paradox are investigated. One occurs when an increase in the number of vacancies causes a candidate to drop from the list of winners. The second occurs when the Condorcet candidate fails to win. Using a Monte Carlo study, we show that the likelihood of paradox can be substantial and depends critically on the degree of homogeneity of voters' preferences and on the number of voters. * We are grateful to Curt Taylor for his excellent and extensive computer programming assistance.