Formal Ontology and Conceptual Realism

✍ Scribed by Nino B. Cocchiarella

• Publisher: Springer
• Year: 2007
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 347
• Series: Synthese Library 339
• Category: Library

✦ Synopsis

Theories about the ontological structure of the world have generally been described in informal, intuitive terms. This book offers an account of the general features and methodology of formal ontology. The book defends conceptual realism as the best system to adopt based on a logic of natural kinds. By formally reconstructing an intuitive, informal ontological scheme as a formal ontology we can better determine the consistency and adequacy of that scheme.

✦ Table of Contents

1402062036......Page 1
Contents......Page 7
Preface......Page 11
Introduction......Page 12
I: Formal Ontology......Page 23
1. Formal Ontology and Conceptual Realism......Page 24
1.1 Formal Ontology as a Characteristica Universalis......Page 25
1.2 Radical Empiricism and the Logical Construction of the World......Page 27
1.3 Commonsense Versus Scientific Understanding......Page 29
1.4 The Nexus of Predication......Page 31
1.5 Univocal Versus Multiple Senses of Being......Page 33
1.6 Predication and Preeminent Being......Page 35
1.7 Categorial Analysis and Transcendental Logic......Page 37
1.8 The Completeness Problem......Page 38
1.9 Set-Theoretic Semantics......Page 40
1.10 Conceptual Realism......Page 42
1.11 Summary and Concluding Remarks......Page 44
2. Time, Being, and Existence......Page 46
2.1 Possibilism versus Actualism......Page 47
2.2 Logics of Actual and Possible Objects......Page 49
2.3 Set-theoretic Semantics......Page 51
2.4 Axioms in Possibilist Logic......Page 52
2.5 A First-orderActualist Logic......Page 55
2.6 Tense Logic......Page 56
2.7 TemporalModes of Being......Page 61
2.8 Past and Future Objects......Page 63
2.9 ModalityWithin Tense Logic......Page 65
2.10 Causal Tenses in Relativity Theory......Page 69
2.11 Summary and Concluding Remarks......Page 73
2.12 Appendix......Page 74
3. Logical Necessity and Logical Atomism......Page 80
3.1 The Ontology of LogicalAtomism......Page 82
3.2 The Primary Semantics of Logical Necessity......Page 85
3.3 TheModal Thesis of Anti-Essentialism......Page 87
3.4 An Incompleteness Theorem......Page 90
3.5 The Semantics of Metaphysical Necessity......Page 91
3.6 Metaphysical Versus Natural Necessity......Page 95
3.7 Summary and Concluding Remarks......Page 99
4. Formal Theories of Predication......Page 101
4.1 Logical Realism......Page 102
4.2 Nominalism......Page 104
4.3 Constructive Conceptualism......Page 107
4.4 Ramification and Holistic Conceptualism......Page 111
4.5 The Logic of Nominalized Predicates......Page 114
4.6 Summary and Concluding Remarks......Page 119
5.1 Homogeneous Stratification......Page 121
5.2 Frege's Logic Reconstructed......Page 124
5.3 Conceptual Intensional Realism......Page 128
5.4 Hyperintensionality......Page 130
5.5 Summary and Concluding Remarks......Page 138
6. Intensional Possible Worlds......Page 141
6.1 Actualism Versus Possibilism Redux......Page 143
6.2 Intensional Possible Worlds......Page 147
6.3 Summary and Concluding Remarks......Page 153
6.4 Appendix 1......Page 154
II: Conceptual Realism......Page 157
7. The Nexus of Predication......Page 158
7.1 Predication in Natural Realism......Page 160
7.2 Conceptualism......Page 161
7.3 Referential Concepts......Page 163
7.4 Singular Reference and Proper Names......Page 166
7.5 Definite Descriptions......Page 167
7.6 Nominalization as Deactivation......Page 170
7.7 The Content of Referential Concepts......Page 172
7.8 The Two Levels of Analysis......Page 175
7.9 Ontology of the Natural Numbers......Page 179
7.10 Ontology of Fictional Objects......Page 182
7.11 Summary and Concluding Remarks......Page 185
8.1 Terminist Logic and Mental Language......Page 187
8.2 Ockham's Early Theory of Ficta......Page 192
8.3 Ockham's Later Theory of Concepts......Page 194
8.4 Personal Supposition and Reference......Page 196
8.5 The Identity Theory of the Copula......Page 198
8.6 Ascending and Descending......Page 201
8.7 How Confused is Merely Confused......Page 209
8.8 Summary and Concluding Remarks......Page 211
9. On Geach Against General Reference......Page 213
9.1 Geach's Negation Argument......Page 214
9.2 Disjunction and Conjunction Arguments......Page 217
9.3 Active Versus Deactivated Concepts......Page 219
9.4 Deactivation and Geach's Arguments......Page 222
9.5 Geach's Arguments Against Complex Names......Page 225
9.6 Relative Pronouns as Referential Expressions......Page 227
9.7 Summary and Concluding Remarks......Page 231
10. Leśniewski's Ontology......Page 233
10.1 Leśniewski's Logic of Names......Page 234
10.2 The Simple Logic of Names......Page 237
10.3 Consistency and Decidability......Page 240
10.4 A Reduction of Leśniewski's System......Page 242
10.5 Pragmatic Uses of Proper and Common Names......Page 246
10.6 Classes as Many as the Extensions of Names......Page 248
10.7 Summary and Concluding Remarks......Page 251
11. Plurals and the Logic of Classes as Many......Page 252
11.1 The Logic of Classes as Many......Page 253
11.2 Extensional Identity......Page 258
11.3 The Universal Class......Page 261
11.4 Intersection, Union, and Complementation......Page 263
11.5 Le11.5 Leśniewskian Theses Revisited......Page 265
11.6 Groups and the Semantics of Plurals......Page 268
11.7 Plural Reference and Predication......Page 272
11.8 Cardinal Numbers and Plural Quantifiers......Page 276
11.9 Summary and Concluding Remarks......Page 281
11.10 Appendix 1: A Set-Theoretic Semantics......Page 283
11.11 Appendix 2: Bell's System M......Page 287
12.1 Conceptual Natural Realism......Page 289
12.2 The Problem with Moderate Realism......Page 291
12.3 Modal Moderate Realism......Page 295
12.4 Aristotelian Essentialism......Page 297
12.5 General Versus Individual Essences......Page 303
12.6 Summary and Concluding Remarks......Page 304
12.7 Appendix 1......Page 306
12.8 Appendix 2......Page 307
Afterword on Truth-Makers......Page 309
Bibliography......Page 313
B......Page 323
C......Page 324
E......Page 325
I......Page 326
L......Page 327
M......Page 328
O......Page 329
Q......Page 330
S......Page 331
Z......Page 332