Fatalism is traditionally conceived as the thesis which claims that, as a matter of logic, whatever happens must happen. Alternately stated, Fatalism tells us that it is a logical impossibility that an event which actually occurs not occur. To put it mildly, this doctrine is not currently popular; indeed Fatalistic gambits are routinely dismissed. Much, if not most, of the disenchantment with arguments for Fatalism resides in the fact that Fatalists seem to require a tensed (or temporal) account of truths and facts; an account which, at best, anti-Fatalists find contentious. We shall presently see that the issue of tensed ontology is more verbal than substantive. But even if it were not, and anti-Fatalists granted the issue of tense to Fatalists, there are surprising resources available which make the resolution of the dispute far from obvious.
Let us begin by considering (RF) as a representative and time-honored argument for Fatalism (RF) (i)
'There will be a sea-battle on 1/1/95' is true, or 'there will not be a sea-battle on 1/1/95' is true. (ii) If 'there will be a sea-battle on 1/1/95' is true, then 'there will be a sea-battle on 1/1/95' was always true; if 'there will not be a sea-battle on 1/1/95' is true, then 'there will not be a sea-battle on 1/1/95' was always true. (iii) If 'there will be a sea-battle on 1/1/95' was always true, then it was always a fact that there will be a sea-battle on 1/1/95; if 'there will not be a sea'battle on 1/1/95' was always true, then it was always a fact that there will not be a sea-battle on 1/1/95.