Tile question with which I wish to deal in this paper is how one should approach religious epistemology. The approach which is most commonly followed is to start with the question of what epistemic warrant I may have for believing the proposition, 'God exists,' or perhaps some other particular proposition of religious belief. At this point, the defender of the faith will argue in one of three ways: (1) The concept of 'God' entails His necessary exist.ence [an ontological argument]. (2) The data of experiencemost likely the fact of motion in the world [cosmological arguments] or the remarkable clock-like operation of the universe [teleological arguments] -constitute conclusive or very strong evidence in favor of the existence of God. (3) The existence of God doesn't need proof or evidence; it is "basic." Along similar lines, the atheologian will argue in one of three comparable ways:
(1) The concept of 'God', or some other concept like 'omnipotence' which we normally take to express a necessary property of God, is logically incoherent. (2) The data of experience -most likely the evil we encounter in the world -constitutes conclusive or very strong evidence against the existence of a God of the sort in which religious people believe. (3) There is simply no reason which should lead us to belief in God, and, lacking such reason, the reasonable person will withhold belief.
* Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the XI Interamerican Congress of Philosophy and the 1986 meeting of the Society for Philosophy of Religion. The version read at the XI Interamerican Congress of Philosophy is forthcoming in a volume of the Acts of the XI Interamerican Congress of Philosophy on philosophy of religion, edited by Walter Redmond. I want to express my appreciation, in particular, to Frederick Ferr6, Thor Hall, and Billy Joe Lucas for their helpful comments on one of those earlier versions.