Expounding the Constitution: Essays in Constitutional Theory

✍ Scribed by Grant Huscroft

• Year: 2008
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 329
• Category: Library

✦ Synopsis

What does it mean to interpret the constitution? Does constitutional interpretation involve moral reasoning, or is legal reasoning something different? What does it mean to say that a limit on a right is justified? How does judicial review fit into a democratic constitutional order? Are attempts to limit its scope incoherent? How should a jurist with misgivings about the legitimacy of judicial review approach the task of judicial review? Is there a principled basis for judicial deference? Do constitutional rights depend on the protection of a written constitution, or is there a common law constitution that is enforceable by the courts? How are constitutional rights and unwritten constitutional principles to be reconciled? In this book, these and other questions are debated by some of the world's leading constitutional theorists and legal philosophers. Their essays are essential reading for anyone concerned with constitutional rights and legal theory.

✦ Table of Contents

Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Contents......Page 7
Preface......Page 9
Contributors......Page 11
I......Page 13
II......Page 19
III......Page 25
Part one: Morality and the enterprise of interpretation......Page 31
1 What Does Constitutional Interpretation Interpret?......Page 33
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AS AN ACTUAL, PRACTICAL ACTIVITY......Page 34
INTERPRETATION WITHOUT AN OBJECT?......Page 35
FAMILIAR ANSWERS, AND OBJECTIONS......Page 37
Enactors’ intentions......Page 41
The Words (in Historical Context)......Page 38
Principles......Page 40
Other Objects?......Page 44
“THE CONSTITUTION” AS PLACEHOLDER......Page 45
NOBLE EQUIVOCATIONS?......Page 46
2. IS THERE AN IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
MORALITY AND POLITICAL MORALITY?......Page 50
3. HOW DOES THE JUDGE’S RESPONSIBILITY TO APPLY
THE LAW AFFECT HIS MORAL REASONING?......Page 61
4. IS THERE AN IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN REASONING MORALLY ON ONE’S OWN ACCOUNT AND REASONING MORALLY IN THE NAME OF A WHOLE SOCIETY?......Page 66
TWO CONCEPTIONS OF MORALITY......Page 77
TWO FURTHER CONCEPTIONS......Page 79
Observation 1......Page 82
Observation 2......Page 83
Observation 3......Page 84
IDENTIFYING A COMMUNITY’S CONSTITUTIONAL MORALITY......Page 85
A RETURN TO JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE POPULAR COMPLAINT......Page 91
Personal Morality Still Being Imposed......Page 92
A Community’s Constitutional Morality and Legal Precedent......Page 94
Judicial Discretion......Page 96
A Community’s Constitutional Morality and the Protection of Minorities......Page 100
Judicial Determination of Rights Under a Bill of Rights is Still Undemocratic......Page 103
INTRODUCTION......Page 105
THE TWO-STAGE MODEL: DEFINITION AND JUSTIFICATION......Page 106
THE TWO-STAGE MODEL AND RIGHTS DISCOURSE......Page 108
THE REASONABLENESS OF RIGHTS......Page 110
THE PRINCIPLE/POLICY DICHOTOMY......Page 113
MAJORITARIAN PREFERENCES AND THE PRINCIPLES OF A “FREE AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY”......Page 116
CONCLUSION......Page 127
Part two: judicial review, legitimacy, and justification......Page 129
i. SHOULD COUNTRIES HAVE CONSTITUTIONS?......Page 131
ii. SHOULD THERE BE AMERICAN OR CANADIAN-STYLE
JUDICIAL REVIEW?......Page 135
iii. SHOULD CONSTITUTIONS HAVE PROVISIONS
ESTABLISHING RIGHTS?......Page 136
iv. SHOULD CONSTITUTIONS ENTRENCH MORAL RIGHTS – AND IF SO, WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW?......Page 138
v. IS THE DEMOCRATIC CRITIQUE OF MORAL-RIGHTS-BASED
JUDICIAL REVIEW COMPELLING?......Page 141
vi. IMPLICATIONS......Page 147
INTRODUCTION......Page 150
WALDRON ON JUDICIAL REVIEW......Page 152
GOLDSWORTHY ON CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION......Page 166
POSITIVISM AND CONSTITUTIONALISM......Page 170
7 The Travails of Justice Waldron......Page 173
i. IN OR OUT?......Page 175
ii. WHAT TO DO?......Page 178
iii. NOTWITHSTANDING’S MANIFEST DESTINY......Page 187
iv. OH THAT I WERE MADE JUDGE IN THE LAND......Page 192
INTRODUCTION......Page 196
THE STRUCTURE OF DEFERENCE......Page 197
THE RATIONALE OF DEFERENCE......Page 199
A QUESTION OF TERMINOLOGY......Page 201
DEFERENCE AND INTERPRETATION......Page 202
MINIMAL AND SUBSTANTIAL DEFERENCE......Page 203
THE ARGUMENT FROM INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE......Page 205
THE ARGUMENT FROM SUPERIOR EXPERTISE......Page 206
THE ARGUMENT FROM DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY......Page 212
DEFERENCE FOR PRUDENTIAL REASONS......Page 215
DEFERENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY......Page 219
HOW SHOULD A JUDGE SHOW DEFERENCE?......Page 224
CONCLUSION......Page 226
Part three: Unwritten Constitutional Principles......Page 229
INTRODUCTION......Page 231
THE CONCEPT OF LAW......Page 232
THE RULE OF LAW AND THE INTEGRITY OF JUDICIAL PROCESS......Page 238
LAW, JUSTICE, AND PRACTICAL REASON......Page 245
CONCLUSION......Page 253
INTRODUCTION......Page 257
THE COMMON LAW CONCEPTION OF UNWRITTEN LAW......Page 260
UNWRITTEN LAW AND CONSTITUTIONALISM......Page 266
The Naturalist Account......Page 269
The Structuralist Account......Page 273
The Scope of the Unwritten Constitution......Page 278
UNWRITTEN LAW, CONSTITUTIONAL HUMILITY, AND THE EQUALITY OF REASON......Page 285
INTRODUCTION......Page 289
Common Law Claims......Page 290
Communicative Implication Claims......Page 291
CONCEPTUAL CLAIMS......Page 292
Strong Common Law Constitutionalism......Page 301
Weak Common Law Constitutionalism......Page 305
Implicit Assumptions......Page 309
Implicit Assumptions in Statutes......Page 311
Implicit Assumptions in Written Constitutions......Page 316
CONCLUSION......Page 324
Index......Page 325