The fact that so many different conditions cause us to experience red does not show that what we experience when we experience red is not an objective property. It only shows that which property it is may no longer be obvious from the variety of conditions that cause us to experience it. (Dretske, 1995, p. 93) Instead of a single ultimate set of analytic units sufficient for the resolution of any problem, we find that distinct kinds of interactions between systems determine new classes of analytic units, or subsystems, that are appropriate to the study of that interaction. (Rosen, 1978, p. xvi) Color subjectivism, it can be argued, is a scientifically motivated philosophical position (e.g., Hardin, 1993). In developing his claim that color subjectivism is untenable, Ross (2001) proposes that the supporting argument based on visual science depends on a mistaken philosophical assumption (the corresponding category constraint). In developing the same claim, we propose that the mistaken assumption behind the supporting argument may be more scientific than philosophical.
In a nutshell, the mistaken scientific assumption is that science is currently in possession of the right physical description of light for investigating color perception. It is this assumption that leads to the first claim of the scientifically motivated argument for subjectivism reported by Ross ( 2001), namely: ''Our ordinary color categories in no way correspond with, and are not explained by, physical categories.'' A recurring theme in the study of perception is that the currently available physical descriptions of the constraints on perception are adopted without question even though the understanding of perception that follows from them is often close to solipsism. There is a pronounced willingness to accept the conclusion that a perceived property is illusory-because it is inconsistent with the currently available physical account-rather than to consider the possibility that the currently available physical Commentary on P. W. Ross (2001). The location problem for color subjectivism. Consciousness and Cognition, 10, 42-58.