Expected utility with ambiguous probabilities and ‘irrational’ parameters
✍ Scribed by Günter Franke
- Publisher
- Springer US
- Year
- 1978
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 735 KB
- Volume
- 9
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0040-5833
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
✦ Synopsis
Savage's expected utility theory has been criticized for various reasons. Two of these are: (1) Subjective probabilities may be more or less ambiguous; this may affect the preference order. Savage's theory rules out any such effect. (2) Savage's theory rules out any influence of certain parameters of a probability distribution on the preference order. Such parameters are fractiles or pairs of fractiles, e.g., which have gained widespread attention as risk measures.
This paper generalizes expected utility theory to include effects of ambiguity and those parameters on the preference order. Basic to this generalization is the classic paper by Herstein/Milnor.
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