Existence of perfect equilibria in a class of multigenerational stochastic games of capital accumulation
✍ Scribed by Łukasz Balbus; Andrzej S. Nowak
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 2008
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 471 KB
- Volume
- 44
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0005-1098
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✦ Synopsis
In this paper we introduce a model of multigenerational stochastic games of capital accumulation where each generation consists of m different players. The main objective is to prove the existence of a perfect stationary equilibrium in an infinite horizon game. A suitable change in the terminology used in this paper provides (in the case of perfect altruism between generations) a new Nash equilibrium theorem for standard stochastic games with uncountable state space.
📜 SIMILAR VOLUMES
We consider an alternative method to the classical one for the determination of Markov perfect Nash equilibria. The approach shown in the paper is based on the study of a quasi-linear system of partial di erential equations instead of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman system. The simpler structure of the