Existence of a coalitionally strategyproof social choice function: A constructive proof
β Scribed by H. Reiju Mihara
- Publisher
- Springer
- Year
- 2001
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 101 KB
- Volume
- 18
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0176-1714
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
π SIMILAR VOLUMES
We characterize strategy-proof social choice functions when individuals have strictly quasi-concave, continuous and satiated utility functions on convex subsets of IR m, representing preferences for the provision of m pure public goods. When specialized to the case m = 1, these assumptions amount to
This paper examines five different voting systems, all extensions of simple majority rule, with respect to eight conditions such systems should meet. The eight conditions are those that remain after eliminating conditions which are satisfied or violated by all five procedures. The results of this pa