Evolutionary minority games: the benefits of imitation

✍ Scribed by Richard Metzler; Christian Horn

• Publisher: Elsevier Science
• Year: 2003
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 192 KB
• Volume: 329
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0378-4371
• DOI: 10.1016/s0378-4371(03)00626-5

✦ Synopsis

In the original Evolutionary Minority Game, a segregation into two populations with opposing preferences is observed under many circumstances. We show that this segregation becomes more pronounced and more robust if the dynamics are changed slightly, such that strategies with above-average ÿtness become more frequent. Similar e ects occur also for a generalization of the EMG to more than two choices, and for evolutionary dynamics of a di erent stochastic strategy for the Minority Game.