Evolutionary games and population dynamics

Evolutionary Games and Population Dynami

📁 Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics

✍ Josef Hofbauer, Karl Sigmund 📂 Library 📅 1998 🏛 Cambridge University Press 🌐 English

Every form of behavior is shaped by trial and error. Such stepwise adaptation can occur through individual learning or through natural selection, the basis of evolution. Since the work of Maynard Smith and others, it has been realized how game theory can model this process. Evolutionary game theory

Population Games and Evolutionary Dynami

📁 Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics (Economic Learning and Social Evolution)

✍ William H. Sandholm 📂 Library 📅 2010 🏛 The MIT Press 🌐 English

Evolutionary Game Dynamics

📁 Evolutionary Game Dynamics

✍ Karl Sigmund (ed.) 📂 Library 📅 2011 🏛 American Mathematical Society 🌐 English

This volume is based on lectures delivered at the 2011 AMS Short Course on Evolutionary Game Dynamics, held January 4-5, 2011 in New Orleans, Louisiana. Evolutionary game theory studies basic types of social interactions in populations of players. It combines the strategic viewpoint of classical ga

Matrix Models for Population, Disease, a

📁 Matrix Models for Population, Disease, and Evolutionary Dynamics

✍ Jim M. Cushing 📂 Library 📅 2024 🏛 American Mathematical Society 🌐 English

<span>This book offers an introduction to the use of matrix theory and linear algebra in modeling the dynamics of biological populations. Matrix algebra has been used in population biology since the 1940s and continues to play a major role in theoretical and applied dynamics for populations structur

Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form

📁 Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games

✍ Ross Cressman 📂 Library 📅 2003 🏛 The MIT Press 🌐 English

Evolutionary game theory attempts to predict individual behavior (whether of humans or other species) when interactions between individuals are modeled as a noncooperative game. Most dynamic analyses of evolutionary games are based on their normal f

Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form

📁 Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games

✍ Ross Cressman 📂 Library 📅 2003 🏛 MIT Press 🌐 English

Evolutionary game theory attempts to predict individual behavior (whether of humans or other species) when interactions between individuals are modeled as a noncooperative game. Most dynamic analyses of evolutionary games are based on their normal forms, despite the fact that many interesting games