Evolutionary ethics
- Book ID
- 104632307
- Publisher
- Springer Netherlands
- Year
- 1986
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 683 KB
- Volume
- 1
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0169-3867
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
โฆ Synopsis
for providing very useful comments upon an earlier draft of this essay. I This a very strong version of legal moralism. For a weaker view, see Joel Feinberg (1980). 2 Cf. the notion of bounded rationality (Simon 1983). It is a conception of rationality which reflects the fact that even as we pursue our ends we rarely make choices with a full view of all the consequences. 3 The failure to make this distinction, in discussions of evolutionary biology, has resulted in countless counterintuitive claims about altruism in that behaviors get to be called altruistic in a way which is woefully at odds with the commonsense use of the term. 4 Suppes does not argue that human infants have altruistic intentions, but that the beliefs of an infant of 22 months far exceed its linguistic skills. See p. 189. A. Baier argues that representations are not needed for intentional action.
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