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Evolutionary dynamics of finite populations in games with polymorphic fitness equilibria

✍ Scribed by Sevan G. Ficici; Jordan B. Pollack


Book ID
108196265
Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
2007
Tongue
English
Weight
448 KB
Volume
247
Category
Article
ISSN
0022-5193

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In an interaction it is possible that one agent has features it is aware of but the opponent is not. These features (e.g. cost, valuation or fighting ability) are referred to as the agent's type. The paper compares two models of evolution in symmetric situations of this kind. In one model the type o