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Evolution of prisoner's dilemma strategies on scale-free networks

โœ Scribed by Ya-Shan Chen; Hai Lin; Chen-Xu Wu


Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
2007
Tongue
English
Weight
365 KB
Volume
385
Category
Article
ISSN
0378-4371

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โœฆ Synopsis


The evolution of strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma on scale-free networks is investigated. It is found that the smaller the average degree is, the easier it is to promote cooperation by natural selection. Cooperation on scale-free networks built upon big clustering coefficients is enhanced and maintained at a high level. The introduction of punishment strategy for unsatisfied agents also increases cooperation and improves its persistence on scale-free networks.


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A three-person iterated prisoner's dilemma (3p-IPD) game is studied. The present simulation uses a lattice model of finite state automata. In particular, the similarity between a noisy 2pand a noiseless 3p-IPD game is discussed. It is known that, due to the noise, Tit for Tat loses its robustness an