Evolution of prisoner's dilemma strategies on scale-free networks
โ Scribed by Ya-Shan Chen; Hai Lin; Chen-Xu Wu
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 2007
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 365 KB
- Volume
- 385
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0378-4371
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
โฆ Synopsis
The evolution of strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma on scale-free networks is investigated. It is found that the smaller the average degree is, the easier it is to promote cooperation by natural selection. Cooperation on scale-free networks built upon big clustering coefficients is enhanced and maintained at a high level. The introduction of punishment strategy for unsatisfied agents also increases cooperation and improves its persistence on scale-free networks.
๐ SIMILAR VOLUMES
A three-person iterated prisoner's dilemma (3p-IPD) game is studied. The present simulation uses a lattice model of finite state automata. In particular, the similarity between a noisy 2pand a noiseless 3p-IPD game is discussed. It is known that, due to the noise, Tit for Tat loses its robustness an