- In an interesting paper in this Journal, 1 Jesse Kalin rejects my argument for the thesis that the Ethical Egoist 'either... must talk in contradictions or... must remain silent in the central cases' (75). I had argued that in cases of irreconcilable conflicts of interest, which I regard as central, as when two persons, B and K, compete for the presidency of a given country, Ethical Egoism requires each to do what is in his best interest and to prevent the other from doing likewise. Hence it would be wrong for each not to prevent the other from promoting his (the other's) interest but also wrong for him to prevent the other from promoting it.
Kalin formulates my argument as follows:
(I) (1) B ought, 2 all things considered, to assassinate K.
(2) K ought, all things considered, to prevent B from assassinating K.
(3) K's preventing B from assassinating K = K's preventing B from doing what B ought to do, all things considered. (4) One ought never to prevent someone from doing what they ought, all things considered, to do. (5) Therefore, K ought not, all things considered, to prevent B from assassinating K. ( 74)
As Kalin rightly points out, this argument can succeed only if premiss (4) is 'an essential part of any moral theory whatsoever' (75), for otherwise the Ethical Egoist could avoid inconsistency simply by denying (4). Kalin then offers two examples to show that (4) is false, and so cannot be an essential part of any moral theory whatsoever. In one of these examples, Jones is prevented from paying a debt by Smith's refusal to lend him money. In the other, Green is prevented from keeping his promise to buy a given thing by Brown's keeping his own promise through buying that very same thing. Thus, Smith (and Brown) supposedly