✦ LIBER ✦
Equilibrium in abstract political economies: with an application to a public good economy with voting
✍ Scribed by Hideo Konishi
- Publisher
- Springer
- Year
- 1996
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 514 KB
- Volume
- 13
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0176-1714
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
✦ Synopsis
Consider an abstract political economy which has a collective choice rule together with strategic interactions among players. We prove that there exists an equilibrium in such an economy by synthesizing an equilibrium existence theorem in generalized games by Sharer and Sonnenschein (1975) and a voting core existence theorem in simple games by Schofield (1984Schofield ( , 1989)). The theorem can be applied to a public good economy where public good provisions are determined by a class of voting rule.