✦ LIBER ✦

Equilibria and comparative statics in two-player contests

✍ Scribed by David A. Malueg; Andrew J. Yates

Book ID: 113590823
Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2005
Tongue: English
Weight: 174 KB
Volume: 21
Category: Article
ISSN: 0176-2680
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2004.11.004

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

📜 SIMILAR VOLUMES

Comparative statics of mixed-strategy eq

Comparative statics of mixed-strategy equilibria in noncooperative two-person games

✍ Vincent P. Crawford; Dennis E. Smallwood 📂 Article 📅 1984 🏛 Springer US 🌐 English ⚖ 315 KB

The Envelope Theorem and Comparative Sta

The Envelope Theorem and Comparative Statics of Nash Equilibria

✍ Michael R. Caputo 📂 Article 📅 1996 🏛 Elsevier Science 🌐 English ⚖ 254 KB

Static and Dynamic Equilibria in Games W

Static and Dynamic Equilibria in Games With Continuum of Players

✍ Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel 📂 Article 📅 2002 🏛 Springer 🌐 English ⚖ 178 KB

Existence, uniqueness and some comparati

Existence, uniqueness and some comparative statics for ratio and Lindahl equilibria

✍ Wolfgang Buchholz; Richard Cornes; Wolfgang Peters 📂 Article 📅 2008 🏛 Springer Vienna 🌐 English ⚖ 200 KB

Voter preferences, simple electoral game

Voter preferences, simple electoral games, and equilibria in two-candidate contests

✍ Lee E. Dutter 📂 Article 📅 1981 🏛 Springer US 🌐 English ⚖ 867 KB

The fundamental assumption of spatial models of party competition is that voters possess cardinal utility functions defined on all combinations of issue positions which candidates may adopt. Furthermore, spatial theorists usually assume that utility functions have a shape common to all voters and th

Characterizing solutions of supermodular

Characterizing solutions of supermodular games; intuitive comparative statics, and unique equilibria

✍ Patrick DeGraba 📂 Article 📅 1995 🏛 Springer 🌐 English ⚖ 414 KB