Epistemic rationality and epistemic normativity
β Scribed by Bondy, Patrick
- Publisher
- Routledge
- Year
- 2018
- Tongue
- English
- Series
- Routledge studies in contemporary philosophy 102
- Edition
- First edition.
- Category
- Library
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
β¦ Table of Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction --
chapter 2 Kinds of Reasons --
chapter 3 Being Guided by Reasons --
chapter 4 Epistemic Deontologism and Strong Doxastic Voluntarism --
chapter 5 The Instrumental Conception of Epistemic Rationality --
chapter 6 Two Problems for the Instrumental Conception of Epistemic Rationality --
chapter 7 The Instrumental Normativity of Epistemic Rationality.
β¦ Subjects
Epistemics;Evidence
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