Practice shows that the more and better that flood protection is organized under the responsibility of well-equipped (national/federal) institutions, the more local investments will occur behind the dikes in the flood-prone zone. This is a typical development, which occurs everywhere in the world where a flood protection system has proven to be reliable and effective. It is then visible to anyone that safety is offered and risk (against inundation) is low. Immediately, behind the levees on the inner side, population and communities will settle and start investing in permanent capital facilities. Consequently, the invested capital and the number of lives (people and cattle) behind the dikes/levees will increase, which leads to a situation where after some time questions in the (local) society arise to offer even more safety and less risk in the flood-prone zones. If the issue receives political attention, no doubt first internal discussions within institutions will start about safety norms and risk levels, then old policies are probably confirmed or adapted. Anyway, the outcome must first be communicated to the public, with proper arguments. In case new draft policies and criteria are proposed, they finally need political approval to become implemented in updated or new policies and resulting measures. Therefore, first a period of public disclosure is required, where not only the directly involved population participates but also third parties such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and professional institutions.
Here, successful flood management arises: if the success is clear and visible, people want more and ask (or more often even shout) for higher and stronger safety criteria and norms, etc. Over a period of decades this can lead to a spiral where managing (and financing!) problems are finally too complicated for practical and pragmatic solutions. Then new policies are required, like ''Room for River concepts'', and approaches as ''flood-prone affected parties should pay for higher safety standards and less risk norms'', etc.
Practice shows that individuals do oppose and seek the support of NGOs. Then communication becomes really critical, because a flood managing authority that is not directly responsible for flood-prone areas, cannot provide solutions as asked for, first of all because of budget restrictions and capacity limitations and second because of restricted and disputed mandates. Then the authority is blamed for everything, deservedly or undeservedly, and a reasonable discussion with the public and NGOs (stakeholders) simply stagnates or even stops. On both sides contemplation is needed; socio-economics will dominate further reflections and discussions (if there still are any). In the worst case, sentiments, emotions and anger will overrule common sense. Decisions will then acquire a strong political character and are no longer based on figures about economic feasibility and required rate of return of investments in infrastructure, as normally needed according to the actual terms of reference of infrastructure-managing authorities as they have traditionally functioned. Other criteria become manifest and determining, and other responsibilities enter in, leading to a situation described as: a successful flood management authority will go down under the burden of its own success (!). This is one of the reasons why the development of a proper method of integrated water management is so essential these days, where societies are becoming more and more complex. That is why institutional reform in the developed countries is also urgently needed. Thereby, a main issue is how to achieve sustainable approaches within