Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly with semipublic firms
✍ Scribed by Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz; María Begoña Garzón
- Book ID
- 106301851
- Publisher
- Springer-Verlag
- Year
- 2010
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 312 KB
- Volume
- 9
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 1617-982X
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
📜 SIMILAR VOLUMES
## Abstract Previous research examining mixed duopolies shows that the use of an optimal incentive contract for the public firm increases welfare and that privatization reduces welfare. We demonstrate that these results do not generalize to a mixed oligopoly with multiple private firms. We derive t
## Abstract We introduce a managerial delegation contract into the mixed duopoly model and examine its influence on price setting in a mixed duopoly in the context of the endogenous‐timing problem. We obtain the result that owners of a public and a private firm prefer to delay the setting of the pr