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Endogenous market power in an emissions trading scheme with auctioning

✍ Scribed by Haita, Corina

Book ID: 123585416
Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2014
Tongue: English
Weight: 426 KB
Volume: 37
Category: Article
ISSN: 0928-7655
DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2014.04.002

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