Electoral equilibria with entry: Some simulations
โ Scribed by Bruce Bender; Timothy C. Haas
- Publisher
- Springer US
- Year
- 1996
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 643 KB
- Volume
- 87
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0048-5829
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
โฆ Synopsis
The objective of this paper is to investigate by means of simulation the impact of thirdparty entry on the spatial separation of candidates. Specifically, we do real-time simulations of Palfrey's (1984) model of electoral equilibria with entry after relaxing some of its assumptions. Our finding that the threat of third-party entry can induce virtually the same spatial separation of the major-party candidates as entry with certainty is both a strong and interesting result.
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