In an interaction it is possible that one agent has features it is aware of but the opponent is not. These features (e.g. cost, valuation or fighting ability) are referred to as the agent's type. The paper compares two models of evolution in symmetric situations of this kind. In one model the type o
Effects of social diversity on the evolutionary game and opinion dynamics
โ Scribed by Han-Xin Yang; Bing-Hong Wang
- Publisher
- Elsevier
- Year
- 2010
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 348 KB
- Volume
- 3
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 1875-3892
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
โฆ Synopsis
We study the role of social diversity in the evolutionary game and opinion dynamics on scale-free networks. Each individual is assigned a weight that is proportional to the power of its degree, where the exponent is an adjustable parameter that controls the level of diversity among individuals in the network. It is found that there exists an optimal value of , leading to the highest cooperation level or the fastest consensus. We give some qualitative explanations for the emergence of optimal .
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