Effect of Time Delay and Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
β Scribed by Tao Yi; Wang Zuwang
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 1997
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 172 KB
- Volume
- 187
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0022-5193
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β¦ Synopsis
In this paper, a simple two-phenotype model with time delay is investigated. The main results are that: (i) the stability of the interior equilibrium point of the pure strategy model not only depends on the property of the payoff matrix but also the effect of time delay; (ii) the conditions of the evolutionarily stable strategy in the two-phenotype model with time delay are completely identical with the conditions in the two-phenotype model with no time delay; and (iii) a mixed evolutionarily stable strategy can be an unstable equilibrium state of the population in the two-phenotype model with time delay.
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