## Abstract We extend the __strategic contract model__ where the owner designs incentive schemes for her manager before the latter takes output decisions. Firstly, we introduce private knowledge regarding costs __within__ each ownerβmanager pair. Under adverse selection, we show that delegation inv
β¦ LIBER β¦
Divisionalization and strategic managerial incentives in oligopoly under uncertainty
β Scribed by Steffen Ziss
- Book ID
- 117361259
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 1999
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 199 KB
- Volume
- 17
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0167-7187
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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