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Dividends and Directors: Do Outsiders Reduce Agency Costs?

✍ Scribed by SUSAN BELDEN; TODD FISTER; BOB KNAPP

Book ID: 110744536
Publisher: John Wiley and Sons
Year: 2005
Tongue: English
Weight: 95 KB
Volume: 110
Category: Article
ISSN: 0045-3609
DOI: 10.1111/j.0045-3609.2005.00009.x

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