Robert Nozick argues that Rawls's difference principle is liable to a fundamental instability. According to Nozick, an 'end-state' theory of distributive justice is any theory which holds that "the justice of a distribution is determined by how things are distributed (who has what) as judged by some structural principle(s) of distribution," 1 Nozick claims that no end-state principle, including Rawls's difference principle, "can be continuously realized without continuous interference into people's lives" because allowing individuals freedom to transfer goods to one another (through gifts, exchanges, etc.) would lead to departures from the specified end-state. ~ Rawls's difference principle requires that social and economic inequalities be arranged so as to be expected to benefit maximally the worst off group, a Any transfer of goods which could be expected to interfere with the establishment or preservation of the distribution required by the difference principle is prohibited by that principle. Nozick concludes that the difference principle is unacceptable because it prohibits a large class of actions, namely, transfers of goods, which are not unjust and whose prohibition constitutes an intolerable limitation on individual liberty. But even if RaMs can rebut Nozick's instability objection, there is another, more serious sort of instability objection to which the difference principle -and any end-state principle -may be liable.
It is generally acknowledged that problems of rectifying past injustices present an awesome challenge to any theory of justice. Recent philosophical literature has focused on the plight of 'victims' of 'compensatory justice'. The most forceful complaint of one who is disadvantaged through efforts to rectify past injustice is not simply that his wants have been thwarted, but also that, as a result of rectificatory policies, his rational long-term planning and consistent execution of plans have worked against him. Quota systems for university admissions illustrate this point well.