Delegation Commitment in Oligopoly
β Scribed by Ya-Chin Wang; Leonard F. S. Wang
- Book ID
- 106387151
- Publisher
- Springer US
- Year
- 2008
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 176 KB
- Volume
- 9
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 1566-1679
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
π SIMILAR VOLUMES
## Abstract Previous research examining mixed duopolies shows that the use of an optimal incentive contract for the public firm increases welfare and that privatization reduces welfare. We demonstrate that these results do not generalize to a mixed oligopoly with multiple private firms. We derive t
This paper shows that it is profitable for a firm to hire an overoptimistic manager to commit to a certain investment strategy in an R&D tournament situation. In the unique symmetric equilibrium, all firms delegate to overoptimistic managers, where the optimal degree of overoptimism depends on the r