Deadly Dilemmas: Deterrence in U.S. Nuclear Strategy
β Scribed by James H. Lebovic
- Publisher
- Columbia University Press
- Year
- 2019
- Tongue
- English
- Leaves
- 264
- Category
- Library
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
β¦ Synopsis
Addresses the socio-political dilemma of the nuclear arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States. Specifically examines the psychology of foreign policy goal formation and achieving nuclear consensus, as well as strategic action, assessment, objectives, weapon deployments, and processes. .
β¦ Table of Contents
Contents
Preface
Acknowledgments
Introduction
1. The Psychology of Foreign Policy Goal Formation
2. Strategic Assessment
3. Strategic Action
4. Strategic Objectives and Weapon Deployments
5. Strategic Processes: Rationality and Nonrationality
6. Concluding Thoughts on Achieving Nuclear Consensus
Notes
References
Name Index
Subject Index
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