De Lingua Belief (A Bradford Book)

✍ Scribed by Robert Fiengo, Robert May

• Publisher: The MIT Press
• Year: 2006
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 191
• Series: Bradford Books
• Category: Library

✦ Synopsis

Speakers, in their everyday conversations, use language to talk about language. They may wonder about what words mean, to whom a name refers, whether a sentence is true. They may worry whether they have been clear, or correctly expressed what they meant to say. That speakers can make such inquiries implies a degree of access to the complex array of knowledge and skills underlying our ability to speak, and though this access is incomplete, we nevertheless can form on this basis beliefs about linguistic matters of considerable subtlety, about ourselves and others. It is beliefs of this sort—de lingua beliefs—that Robert Fiengo and Robert May explore in this book. Fiengo and May focus on the beliefs speakers have about the semantic values of linguistic expressions, exploring the genesis of these beliefs and the explanatory roles they play in how speakers use and understand language. Fiengo and May examine the resources available to speakers for generating linguistic beliefs, considering how linguistic theory characterizes the formal, syntactic identity of the expressions linguistic beliefs are about and how this affects speakers' beliefs about coreference. Their key insight is that the content of beliefs about semantic values can be taken as part of what we say by our utterances. This has direct consequences, examined in detail by Fiengo and May, for explaining the informativeness of identity statements and the possibilities for substitution in attributions of propositional attitudes, cases in which speakers' beliefs about coreference play a central role.

✦ Table of Contents

Cover......Page 1
Title Page......Page 5
Contents......Page 9
Acknowledgments......Page 11
Introduction......Page 13
1.1 Foundational Questions......Page 19
1.2 Syntactic Identity and Referential Identity......Page 37
1.3 Anaphora, Context, and Referential Intentions......Page 46
Notes......Page 58
2 Names and Expressions......Page 63
2.1 Distinguishing Names and Expressions......Page 64
Translation......Page 68
Assignments......Page 72
2.3 Belief Ascription and Attributed Assignments......Page 75
Translation of Attributed Assignments: The Translated De Dicto Puzzle......Page 80
2.4 Singularity......Page 82
2.5 Identity Puzzles......Page 87
2.6 Concluding Remarks......Page 92
Appendix: The Propositional Status of Assignments......Page 94
Are Assignments Arbitrary?......Page 96
Are Assignments Trivial?......Page 99
Are Assignments Informative?......Page 100
Are Assignments Contingent or Necessary?......Page 103
Notes......Page 105
3.1 Two Intuitions about Identity Statements......Page 111
3.2 On What It Is That Bears Reference......Page 119
3.3 The Logical Form of Identity Statements......Page 124
3.4 Names, Expressions, and Rigidity......Page 130
Notes......Page 141
4.1 The Puzzle......Page 151
4.2 Linguistic Information......Page 154
4.3 Bridging the Gap......Page 157
4.4 The Puzzle Deepens......Page 160
4.5 The Identity Puzzle......Page 164
4.6 Informativeness and the Reverse Puzzle......Page 166
4.7 A Demonstrative Puzzle......Page 170
4.8 Demonstrative Reference......Page 176
Notes......Page 180
References......Page 185
Index......Page 189