Currency crisis duration and interest defence
β Scribed by Tullio Gregori
- Book ID
- 102278264
- Publisher
- John Wiley and Sons
- Year
- 2009
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 144 KB
- Volume
- 14
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 1076-9307
- DOI
- 10.1002/ijfe.372
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
β¦ Synopsis
Abstract
Asymmetric wars of attrition between speculators and a Central Bank can provide a useful framework to address currency crisis length and explain why a speculative attack can fail after some time. Interest rate defence can be analysed too. A nonβlinear relationship between interest rates and peg defence emerges, as a rate upsurge can reduce both concession times. With some welfare loss functions, increasing the domestic rate too much is a selfβdefeating policy as the Central Bank will opt out before speculators concede, but the reverse holds for lower rates. Copyright Β© 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
π SIMILAR VOLUMES
In the 1990s, currency crises in Europe, Mexico and Southeast Asia have drawn worldwide attention to speculative attacks on government-controlled exchange rates. To improve our understanding of these events, researchers have undertaken new theoretical and empirical work. In this paper, we provide so