<p>This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholar
Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes
✍ Scribed by Thad Dunning
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Year
- 2008
- Tongue
- English
- Leaves
- 351
- Series
- Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
- Edition
- 1
- Category
- Library
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
✦ Synopsis
This book challenges the conventional wisdom that natural resource wealth promotes autocracy. Oil and other forms of mineral wealth can promote both authoritarianism and democracy, the book argues, but they do so through different mechanisms; an understanding of these different mechanisms can help elucidate when either the authoritarian or democratic effects of resource wealth will be relatively strong. Exploiting game-theoretic tools and statistical modeling as well as detailed country case studies and drawing on fieldwork in Latin America and Africa, this book builds and tests a theory that explains political variation across resource-rich states. It will be read by scholars studying the political effects of natural resource wealth in many regions, as well as by those interested in the emergence and persistence of democratic regimes.
✦ Table of Contents
Cover......Page 1
Half-title......Page 3
Title......Page 7
Copyright......Page 8
List of Tables......Page 11
List of Figures......Page 13
Preface and Acknowledgments......Page 17
1 Does Oil Promote Democracy?......Page 25
1.1 The Authoritarian and Democratic Effects of Natural Resources......Page 29
1.2 Explaining Variation......Page 39
1.3 Method and Plan of the Book......Page 49
2 The Foundations of Rentier States......Page 61
2.1 Sources of Rents......Page 63
2.2 Fiscal Effects: Natural Resources and Taxation......Page 69
2.3 Toward the Political Effects of Rents......Page 76
2.3.1 The Democratic Effect of Resource Rents......Page 78
3 Resource Rents and the Political Regime......Page 85
3.1.1 The Setting......Page 88
3.1.2 Timing of the Coup Game and Definition of Equilibrium......Page 92
3.1.3 Solving the Coup Game......Page 94
3.1.4 Comparative Statics......Page 100
3.1.5 Explaining Variation......Page 105
3.2 A Model of Democratization......Page 112
3.2.1 Timing of Democratization Game......Page 113
3.2.2 Analysis......Page 115
3.2.3 Comparative Statics......Page 122
3.3 Discussion and Interpretation......Page 124
4 Statistical Tests on Rents and the Regime......Page 131
4.1.1 Resource Rents......Page 135
4.1.2 Resource Dependence......Page 137
4.1.3 Private Inequality......Page 138
4.1.4 Democracy......Page 143
4.2.1 A Direct Test......Page 145
4.2.2 An Indirect Test......Page 152
4.2.3 Dichotomous Regimes......Page 156
4.2.4 The Authoritarian Effect of Resource Dependence......Page 158
4.3.1 A Dynamic Probit Model......Page 160
4.3.2 Coups......Page 163
4.4 Assessing the Large-N Evidence......Page 164
5 The Democratic Effect of Rents......Page 172
5.1 Case Selection: Probing the Mechanisms......Page 173
5.2 Venezuela: The Rise and Demise of Rentier Democracy......Page 176
5.2.1 The Rise of the Democratic Rentier State......Page 180
5.2.2 The Demise of the Democratic Rentier State......Page 190
5.2.3 The Renewal of the Democratic Rentier State?......Page 207
5.2.4 Alternative Explanations......Page 227
6 Rentier Democracy in Comparative Perspective......Page 234
6.1 Chile: Class Conflict in a Rentier Democracy......Page 237
6.1.1 The Rentier State and Democracy in Chile......Page 239
6.1.2 Redistributive Conflict and the Coup of 1973......Page 251
6.2 Bolivia: Rents, Revolution, and Democracy......Page 255
6.2.1 The Rule of la Rosca and the Bolivian Revolution......Page 257
6.2.2 Rentier Statism after 1952......Page 262
6.2.3 Oil, Gas, and the Rise and Demise (and Rise) of the Rentier State......Page 266
6.3 Ecuador: Oil Booms and Democratization......Page 277
6.3.1 The Coup of 1972 and Redemocratization in 1979......Page 278
6.4 Botswana: An African Anomaly......Page 282
7 Theoretical Extensions......Page 292
7.1 Revenue Volatility......Page 293
7.2 The Dutch Disease......Page 296
7.3 Resource Ownership......Page 298
8 Conclusion: Whither the Resource Curse?......Page 302
8.1 Crude Democracies and Crude Autocracies......Page 303
8.2 Resources and Democracy: A Normative Coda......Page 313
Appendix: Construction of the Simulations......Page 317
Bibliography......Page 321
Index......Page 341
✦ Subjects
Политические дисциплины;Политология;Политическая идеология, политические режимы и системы;
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