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Crowding-out voluntary contributions to public goods

✍ Scribed by Kenneth S Chan; Rob Godby; Stuart Mestelman; R Andrew Muller

Book ID: 117349893
Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2002
Tongue: English
Weight: 87 KB
Volume: 48
Category: Article
ISSN: 0167-2681
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-2681(01)00232-3

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