This paper studies a monopoly firm with the ability to conduct costly pre-market testing of its product in order to predict how safe this product is to consume. While there are private incentives to test, the amount of testing effort supplied by a monopolist need not be optimal. In a model which all
Cross-subsidization and cost misallocation by regulated monopolists
β Scribed by Timothy J. Brennan
- Publisher
- Springer US
- Year
- 1990
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 883 KB
- Volume
- 2
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0922-680X
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β¦ Synopsis
While cross-subsidization is understood theoretically as involving the sustainability of a cost allocation scheme, it is invoked in regulatory policy contexts, such as the divestiture of AT&T, where costs of serving unregulated markets may be bome by ratepayers of regulated monopolies. We analyze two cross-subsidization tactics--cost misallocation and distorted technological choice-under a spectrum of regulatory cost allocation policies. These tactics lead to higher prices in regulated markets and inefficient production in unregulated markets. Welfare effects are discussed; we conclude with observations on strategic behavior and regulatory policy.
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