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Credible Collusion in Spatially Separated Markets

✍ Scribed by John Gross; William L. Holahan

Book ID: 108563880
Publisher: John Wiley and Sons
Year: 2003
Tongue: English
Weight: 163 KB
Volume: 44
Category: Article
ISSN: 0020-6598
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00071

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

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