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Cournot–Walras equilibrium as a subgame perfect equilibrium

✍ Scribed by Francesca Busetto; Giulio Codognato; Sayantan Ghosal

Publisher: Springer-Verlag
Year: 2008
Tongue: English
Weight: 233 KB
Volume: 37
Category: Article
ISSN: 0020-7276
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-008-0123-8

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This article presents some new, intuitive derivations of several results in the bargaining literature. These new derivations clarify the relationships among these results and allow them to be understood in a unified way. These results concern the way in which the risk posture of the bargainers affec