'Ding Chen's detailed institutional analysis of the development of the Chinese stock market brings the question of enforcement to centre stage. In doing so, she not only introduces readers to the particularities of the Chinese system; she also sheds new light on conventional debates about the law and economics of corporate governance.'
- Andrew Johnston, University of Sheffield, UK
'In this book Dr Ding Chen has made an important theoretical contribution to our understanding of corporate governance in transitional economies and of corporate governance in China especially. Drawing upon the insights of New Institutional Economics theory she examines the interplay between formal and informal enforcement mechanisms relating to corporate governance in China. To support this argument the book breaks new ground by providing a comprehensive examination of enforcement actions in China's stock market; her findings are at variance from conclusions found in other research, such as in the law and finance literature. Rather than simply imitating the dominant Anglo-American model of corporate governance, she argues that local conditions will greatly affect the choice of the most appropriate governance models. This has been especially so in China.'
- Roman Tomasic, University of South Australia and Durham Law School, UK
This important new book attempts to establish a fresh conceptual framework for the study of corporate governance by employing the new institutional economics of contract enforcement. This framework helps to clarify two critical issues including the role of law in financial development and whether there is an optimal corporate governance model that should be followed by countries attempting to develop their own stock markets.
Applying this novel framework, the author conducts a comprehensive study on Chinese corporate governance and discovers that the Chinese stock market has rapidly expanded even in the absence of any effective institutions. She provides a credible explanation to this 'China puzzle' by arguing that the growth of the stock market is mainly driven by state guarantees, institutional rent seeking by state-owned companies, financial repression and investors' speculation. Indeed, there is probably nowhere better to look than China's stock market to assess the limits of the gradualist approach to financial development. As the book explains, the potential efficiency gains that could be created by a healthy, well-functioning stock market have been completely outweighed by the consideration of maintaining the existing political system.
This book will appeal to scholars and students of economics and law with an interest in corporate governance, Chinese economic development and new institutional economics.
Contents: Introduction 1. Theoretical Framework 2. Historical Background and Characteristics of the Chinese Stock Market 3. Enforcement in China s Capital Market 4. Developing a Capital Market Under Weak Enforcement 5. Conclusion References Index