We study the cost-of-adjustment model of investment when there is asymmetry of information between owners (the principal) and managers (the agent). Information asymmetry distorts the relationship between investment and the cost of capital for all agent types, and a regime of inaction appears over a
β¦ LIBER β¦
Corporate financing and investment decisions under asymmetric information
β Scribed by Y. Lal Mahajan
- Publisher
- Springer US
- Year
- 1999
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 184 KB
- Volume
- 5
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 1083-0898
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