It is generally believed that any plausible version of materialism must at least provide an adequate solution to the problem of phenomenal propertiesJ It is also clear from the literature that the task which the materialist faces is not an easy one. James W. Cornman has developed a version which might be able to resolve the problem and, thereby, allow the possible reduction of sensations to certain material items, namely, brain events. 2 He calls his version, Adverbial Materialism (henceforth, A.M). His major contention is that A~/might have the best chance of solving the problem of phenomenal properties in comparison to other competing materialist theories of the mental, e.g., Reductive Materialism, Eliminative Materialism, Central State-Functional Materialism, etc. In tiffs paper I shall try to undermine Cornman's confidence inAM.
The text of this paper will be divided into four sections. In the first section, a reconstruction of Comman's argument for A31/is presented. In the second section, I try to argue that the reconstructed argument rests on a crucial but dubious premiss. A general criticism against AM is outlined in the third section. In the final section, I consider and try to rebut a general objection against my critique of AM. An appendix is added in which I briefly state a set of technical definitions which Cornmann uses in articulating the major tenets of materialism and, in particular, those of AM. These definitions will also assume a critical role in my response to a general criticism of my attack against AM.