Cooperative Decision-Making Under Risk

✍ Scribed by Jeroen Suijs (auth.)

• Publisher: Springer US
• Year: 2000
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 144
• Series: Theory and Decision Library 24
• Edition: 1
• Category: Library

✦ Synopsis

In cooperative games, one generally assumes that the agents know exactly the joint (monetary) gains that can be achieved by any possible coalition of cooperating agents. In reality, however, only little is known with certainty. This does not necessarily imply that traditional cooperative game theory cannot be applied in practical situations, for in various cases knowledge of the expected gains suffices. In many other cases, however, it is just the sharing of risk that is beneficial. Joint ventures, for instance, exist since cooperation reduces the risk of the investment for the individual parties. Since the existing models fail to incorporate such risks, they are not suitable for analyzing cooperative decision-making under risk. This book aims to rectify this deficiency by discussing a model of cooperative games with random payoffs.

✦ Table of Contents

Front Matter....Pages i-ix
Introduction....Pages 1-6
Cooperative Game Theory....Pages 7-41
Stochastic Cooperative Games....Pages 43-55
The Core, Superadditivity, and Convexity....Pages 57-62
Nucleoli for Stochastic Cooperative Games....Pages 63-87
Risk Sharing and Insurance....Pages 89-105
Price Uncertainty in Linear Production Situations....Pages 107-121
Back Matter....Pages 123-142

✦ Subjects

Economic Theory; Operation Research/Decision Theory; Finance/Investment/Banking