Cooperation in public dilemmas (and in externality dilemmas generally) is sometimes explained as a function of players' experience with the game: The more experience, the less cooperation. Experience, however, can produce both knowledge about how others will play the game (in particular, that they w
Cooperation in social dilemmas and allocentrism: a social values approach
✍ Scribed by Lorne G. Hulbert; Maria L. Corrêa da Silva; Gloria Adegboyega
- Publisher
- John Wiley and Sons
- Year
- 2001
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 141 KB
- Volume
- 31
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0046-2772
- DOI
- 10.1002/ejsp.53
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
📜 SIMILAR VOLUMES
Two studies investigated how values affect competitive versus cooperative behavior. Each Study presented a new social-dilemma game, in which participants' interpretations of the dilemma (i.e., their subjective payoff matrix)-and consequently the dominant (i.e., rational) behavioral choice-depended o
Three experimental studies were conducted to examine two alternative explanations for the widely established positive eect of social identi®cation in promoting cooperation in social dilemmas. We hypothesised that social identi®cation eects could be either ascribed to (1) an increase in the value ass
## Abstract Prior theorizing of rationality in social dilemmas suggests that individuals pursuing different interaction goals may ‘perceive’ different associations between competence and behaviour in a social dilemma, arguing that competitive individuals associate competence with noncooperation (i.