๐”– Bobbio Scriptorium
โœฆ   LIBER   โœฆ

Controlling innovative projects with moral hazard and asymmetric information

โœ Scribed by Rouven Bergmann; Gunther Friedl


Book ID
116862115
Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
2008
Tongue
English
Weight
223 KB
Volume
37
Category
Article
ISSN
0048-7333

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ESTIMATING ADVERSE SELECTION AND MORAL H
โœ Xiangping Liu; Danijel Nestic; Tomislav Vukina ๐Ÿ“‚ Article ๐Ÿ“… 2011 ๐Ÿ› John Wiley and Sons ๐ŸŒ English โš– 147 KB

## SUMMARY We use invoices for hospital services from a regional hospital in Croatia to test for adverse selection and moral hazard. There are three categories of patients: with no supplemental insurance, who bought it, and who are entitled to it for free. Our identification procedure relies on the