Control and Game-Theoretic Models of the Environment
β Scribed by A. Haurie, G. Zaccour (auth.), Carlo Carraro, Jerzy A. Filar (eds.)
- Publisher
- BirkhΓ€user Basel
- Year
- 1995
- Tongue
- English
- Leaves
- 367
- Series
- Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games 2
- Edition
- 1
- Category
- Library
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
β¦ Synopsis
This book collects some recent works on the application of dynamic game and control theory to the analysis of environmental problems. This collecΒ tion of papers is not the outcome of a conference or of a workshop. It is rather the result of a careful screening from among a number of contribuΒ tions that we have solicited across the world. In particular, we have been able to attract the work of some of the most prominent scholars in the field of dynamic analyses of the environment. Engineers, mathematicians and economists provide their views and analytical tools to better interpret the interactions between economic and environmental phenomena, thus achievΒ ing, through this interdisciplinary effort, new and interesting results. The goal of the book is more normative than descriptive. All papers include careful modelling of the dynamics of the main variables involved in the game between nature and economic agents and among economic agents themselves, as well-described in Vrieze's introductory chapter. FurΒ thermore, all papers use this careful modelling framework to provide policy prescriptions to the public agencies authorized to regulate emission dyΒ namics. Several diverse problems are addressed: from global issues, such as the greenhouse effect or deforestation, to international ones, such as the management of fisheries, to local ones, for example, the control of effluent discharges. Moreover, pollution problems are not the only concern of this book.
β¦ Table of Contents
Front Matter....Pages i-xxiii
Front Matter....Pages 1-1
Differential Game Models of Global Environmental Management....Pages 3-23
Sustainability and the Greenhouse Effect: Robustness Analysis of the Assimilation Function....Pages 25-45
Consumption of Renewable Environmental Assets, International Coordination and Time Preference....Pages 47-65
Sustainable International Agreements on Greenhouse Warming β A Game Theory Study....Pages 67-87
The Environmental Costs of Greenhouse Gas Emissions....Pages 89-105
Front Matter....Pages 107-107
Taxation and Environmental Innovation....Pages 109-139
Environmental Quality, Public Finance and Sustainable Growth....Pages 141-173
Environmental Pollution and Endogenous Growth....Pages 175-200
Rate-of-Return Regulation, Emission Charges and Behavior of Monopoly....Pages 201-229
Polluterβs Capital Quality Standards and Subsidy-Tax Programs for Environmental Externalities: A Competitive Equilibrium Analysis....Pages 231-256
Front Matter....Pages 257-257
The ESS Maximum Principle as a Tool for Modeling and Managing Biological Systems....Pages 259-278
Pollution, Renewable Resources and Irreversibility....Pages 279-297
The Economic Management of High Seas Fishery Resources: Some Game Theoretic Aspects....Pages 299-318
Pollution-Induced Business Cycles: A Game Theoretical Analysis....Pages 319-336
Management of Effluent Discharges: A Dynamic Game Model....Pages 337-356
Back Matter....Pages 357-357
β¦ Subjects
Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences; Systems Theory, Control; Mathematical Modeling and Industrial Mathematics
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