Contests with an unknown number of contestants
✍ Scribed by Johannes Münster
- Publisher
- Springer US
- Year
- 2006
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 288 KB
- Volume
- 129
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0048-5829
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
📜 SIMILAR VOLUMES
An all-pay contest in which many players compete for an indivisible resource and each player continuously maintains a different resource holding potential (RHP) is analysed. There exists the unique pure ESS function, which is common sense; that is, a higher RHP induces a higher level of investment,
## Abstract Using evolutionary theory as its underlying perspective this research explores the relationship between evolved social behaviors; specifically emergent social structures, and the ecology of the social group; specifically the contestability of the resource context. Contexts where resourc