Consequences of fluctuating group size for the evolution of cooperation
✍ Scribed by Åke Brännström; Thilo Gross; Bernd Blasius; Ulf Dieckmann
- Publisher
- Springer
- Year
- 2010
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 422 KB
- Volume
- 63
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0303-6812
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The evolution of cooperation is studied in a lattice-structured population, in which each individual plays the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game with its neighbors. The population includes Tit-for-Tat (TFT, a cooperative strategy) and All Defect (AD, a selfish strategy) distributed over the lattice p
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